

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 123334

50  
ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 FILE-01 ( ADP ) R

66601  
DRAFTED BY: S/ S- O: JDLEE  
APPROVED BY: S/ S- O: RWRIGHT  
----- 036320

P 231614 Z JUN 73 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 123334

EXDIS TOSEC 5

PLEASE PASS TO DAVID LISSY OR JANE ROTHE IN SAN CLEMENTE  
FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, JUN 22, FROM NATO RPTD TO  
YOU:

QUOTE

S E C R E T NATO 3026  
EXDIS  
E. O. 11652: XGDS 1  
TAGS: MARR, NATO  
SUBJECT: NAC MEETING JUNE 22: AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR

BEGIN SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD, AT A RESTRICTED MEETING  
OF THE NAC ON JUNE 22, READ TO THE COUNCIL THE TEXT OF THE  
US- USSR AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND  
GAVE AN EXPLANATORY STATEMENT. ALLIES MADE PRELIMINARY EXPRESSIONS  
OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD SATISFY  
ALLIANCE SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT SEVERAL EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO  
PUBLIC REACTION TO ANTICIPATED PRESS HANDLING OF THE AGREEMENT.  
SOME THOUGHT THE PUBLIC MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 123334

US NUCLEAR DETERRENT WAS NOT BEING LIMITED SO THAT IT WOULD NOT  
EFFECTIVELY DETER CONVENTIONAL WAR. MOST STRESSED THAT  
THEY WERE NOT CRITICIZING THE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT BUT  
ONLY EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR PROPER BALANCE IN PUBLIC DIS-  
CUSSIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. ALL REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THEIR  
COMMENTS WERE PRELIMINARY AND THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD

UNDOBTEDLY WISH TO CONSULT FURTHER ON THE AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE ( BELGIUM) STRESSED THE " FUNDAMENTAL" IMPORTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE STATEMENT WHICH AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD HAD MADE. HE ADDED THAT DR. KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE DEALING WITH THIS AGREEMENT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT IN SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION. WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT THE AGREEMENT WAS ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. DE STAERCKE'S FIRST SUBSTANTIVE POINT WAS THAT FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR HAD HELPED TO PREVENT A CONVENTIONAL WAR. MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE PUBLIC THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASED POSSIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL WAR. SECONDLY, DE STAERCKE WONDERED WHETHER THE AGREEMENT DID NOT CREATE A " PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP" BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. CONCLUDING, DE STAERCKE SAID THIS HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REACT OFFICIALLY LATER AND HE DID NOT WISH TO SAY MORE ON THIS VERY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT AT THIS TIME.

2. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE ( FRANCE) SHARED DE STAERCKE' S OPINION. THERE WERE GREAT DANGERS IN CONVENTIONAL WAR AS WELL AS NUCLEAR. WHAT WAS HAPPENING WAS THAT THERE WAS AN INCREASING STABILIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. IT BEGAN WITH SALT, WOULD PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE NEXT SALT AGREEMENTS, AND THIS PRESENT AGREEMENT WOULD MAKE A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO STABLIZING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U. S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. DE ROSE THOUGHT THAT " WE SHOULD BE HAPPY ABOUT SUCH AGREEMENTS" HSINCE THE WHOLE WORLD WOULD PROFIT FROM THEM. HOWEVER, THE QUESTION AROSE AS TO WHETHER EUROPE WAS BECOMING A MARGINAL AREA WHERE CONFLICTS WOULD AGAIN BECOME POSSIBLE. AS FONMIN JOBERT HAD RECENTLY SAID, THE PARTICULAR CHARACTER OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE IS QUITE CLEAR. THE THREAT TO THE U. S. AND THE USSR IS THROUGH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. EUROPE, HOWEVER, CAN BE HIT BY BOTH CON-

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 123334

VENTIONAL AND BY TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR. DEFENSE DOCTRINE MIGHT BE AFFECTED BY THE POSSIBILITY THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE USED, EVEN THOUGH FORMAL REPLY MIGHT BE " NO," MIGHT THERE NOT BE A QUESTION MARK. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD REACT FURTHER AND THAT HE BELIEVED THE COUNCIL SHOULD DELIBERATE THE MATTER.

3. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD BEGAN HIS INITIAL REPLY TO QUESTIONS BY QUOTING FROM SECRETARY ROGERS' COPENHAGEN STATEMENT AS BACKGROUND IN WHICH THE SECRETARY STATED, " WE ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THE COMMITMENT TO AVOID MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS, TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS AND NOT TO SEEK UNI-LATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER..... PRESIDENT NIXON WILL BE SEEKING IN THESE TALKS TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN THE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO POLICIES REFLECTED IN THESE PRINCIPLES."

AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN ADDITION TO THIS COUNCIL MEETING AND THE BRIEFING THAT WOULD BE GIVEN TO NATO AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON, AND THE US AND SOVIET PRESS BRIEFING WHICH WOULD BE HELD LATER TODAY, DR. KISSINGER, IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S INVITATION, HAD AGREED TO MEET WITH THE NATO PERMREPS, THE SYG AND THE DEPUTY SYG WHO WOULD BE IN THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SACLANT SYMPOSIUM, AT SAN CLEMENTE THE MORNING OF JUNE 30. THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO RAISE SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THEY MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE AGREEMENT, ABOUT THE TOTALITY OF THE NIXON- BREZHNEV VISIT AND OTHER SUBJECTS. RESPONDING TO SPECIFIC POINTS, RUMSFELD REITERATED PORTIONS OF THE TEXT AND STATEMENT. HE INDICATED THAT HIS READING OF THE MATERIAL CONVINCED HIM THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT AN AGREEMENT NOT TO GO TO WAR AS ONE QUESTION SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE SEEN. THE AGREEMENT DID NOT AS SUCH PROHIBIT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. REGARDING THE POINT ABOUT " PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIPS," RUMSFELD EMPHASIZED THAT THIS AGREEMENT

WAS NOT A " SEPARATE DEAL" BUT RATHER IT EXTENDED TO ALLIES AND THIRD PARTIES IN ITS EFFECT. RUMSFELD BELIEVED THAT THE AGREEMENT CONTRIBUTED TO A SYSTEM OF CONSTRAINTS IN INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. RUMSFELD ADDED THAT THIS WAS, OF COURSE, A SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT; IT MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 123334

FORCE IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES. HOWEVER, IF THE AGREEMENT WERE VIOLATED, AS ANY PIECE OF PAPER COULD BE, IF FORCE WERE USED OR THREATENED BY THE SOVIETS, US OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT WOULD BECOME INVALID. AS TO THE POINT EBOUT EUROPE BEING LEFT AS A MARGINAL AREA, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD ANSWERED WCTT A " FLAT NO", REREADING ARTICLE VI.

4. SPIERENBURG (NETHERLANDS) THOUGHT THAT THE PUBLIC MIGHT SEE THE AGREEMENT AS AN AGREEMENT ON NON- FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE THOUGHT THAT US NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT BE USED COULD BE VARIED: SOME MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT SUPPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR FORCE, OTHERS MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT DEFENSE EFFORTS WOULD BE RELAXED. TOGETHER WITH THE WELL- KNOWN PROBLEM OF THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT IN THE US SENATE, SPIERENBURG THOUGHT THIS NEW AGREEMENT MIGHT CONFUSE THE SITUATION IN EUROPE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING AND LATER REITERATING THAT HIS REMARKS WERE PURELY PERSONAL, WERE NOT INTENDED TO CRITICIZE THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT' S REACTION MIGHT BE QUITE DIFFERENT.

5. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD REMARKED THAT IN MANYHTINGS DEALT WITH IN NATO THERE WAS A DITEMMA AND A CLASSIC EXAMPLE WAS THE SIMULTANEOUS PURSUITOF DEFENSE AND DETENTE, BOTH OF WHICH HAD TO BE PURSUED. HE QUOTED AGAIN FROM HIS OPENING

STATEMENT REGARDING THE FACT THAT REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WAS A BASIC DOCTRINE OF AMERICAN POLICY, IT WAS HARDLY NEW, AND WAS A POLICY SUPPORTED BY ALL OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE ALLIANCE. AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKE INTERJECTED THAT THE MAIN POINT THAT CONCERNED HIM WAS THE IMPLIED SEPARATION OF THE "NUCLEAR DANGER" FROM THE "CONVENTIONAL DANGER".

6. AMBASSADOR PECK (UK) AGREED, COMMENTING THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD AMOUNT TO A DECOUPLING OF THE NUCLEAR FROM THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT. ALTHOUGH THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT UNDOUBTEDLY PROTECTED ALLIED INTERESTS, HE SHARED SPIRENBURG'S CONCERN ABOUT PUBLIC REACTION TO THE AGREEMENT. HE HOPED THAT DR KISSINGER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE SUBJECT WOULD EMPHASIZE ALLIED INTERESTS IN THIS MATTER. HE ASKED HOW THE AGREEMENT RELATED TO

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 123334

CHINA AND WHETHER, SINCE THE AGREEMENT DID NOT SPEAK OF US OF FORCE AGAINST ONE OF THE PARTY'S OWN ALLIES, THERE WAS NOT A LOOPHOLE FOR THE BREZHNEV DOCTINE. HE CONCLUDED BY SUGGESTING THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT RUSH TO CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT BUT THAT IT SHOULD BE ON THE AGENDA FOR THE COUNCIL FOR JULY.

7. AMBASSADOR ERALP (TURKEY) SAID THAT HIS FIRST REACTIONS TO THE TEXT AND TO THE REMARKS MADE BY AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD WERE FAVORABLE. HE ATTACHED MUCH IMPORTANCE TO AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S REMARKS AND THOUGHT THAT THEY WENT FAR TO DISPEL THE DOUBTS OF HIS COLLEAGUES. THE AGREEMENT AMOUNTED TO A STATEMENT OF POLICY TO TRY TO AVOID USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE AGREEMENT AS REMOVING THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT AND NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD HAD SAID THAT A PARTY WOULD BE FREED FROM THE AGREEMENT IF THERE WERE A VIOLATION OF IT. HE BELIEVED THAT NATO'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT WAS NOT IN DOUBT.

8. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THAT WHILE HE COULD ONLY WELCOME THIS VERY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT, ONE SHOULD ALSO LOOK AT ITS REPERCUSSIONS. EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THEIR OWN STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LIGHT OF THIS EVENT.  
ALTHOUGH HE HOPED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION AFTER SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS, HE BELIEVED THAT THE PROBLEM FOR EUROPE WOULD REMAIN.

9. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD STRESSED AGAIN THAT HE THOUGHT THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT APPLIED TO THE USE OF FORCE OF ANY KIND RPT OF ANY KIND. REGARDING AMBASSADOR PECK'S COMMENT ON CHINA, AND THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENT SPOKE OF "OTHER COUNTRIES." HE UNDERLINED AMBASSADOR ERALP'S STATEMENT THAT DETERRENCE REMAINS

UNAFFECTED.

10. AMBASSADOR KRAPF ( FRG) COMMENTED THAT HIS REACTION  
WAS ONE OF " SHOCK" BUT HE WAS INTERESTED THAT THERE WERE  
OTHER REACTIONS SUCH AS THAT EXPRESSED BY AMBASSADOR ERALP,

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 123334

WHICH INDICATED THAT THE AGREEMENT NEEDED CAREFUL ANALYSIS.  
ONE OF KRAPF'S PROBLEMS WAS THE TITLE WHICH SPOKE OF  
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT  
TO EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS REALLY ABOUT.

11. AMBASSADOR BUSCH ( NORWAY) SAID HE THOUGHT HIS AUTHORITIES  
WOULD WELCOME THE INTENT OF THE AGREEMENT AND HE THOUGHT IT  
WAS TOO EARLY TO MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF IT, ESPECIALLY ONE ON  
THE NEGATIVE SIDE. ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE SIDE EFFECTS TO  
DEAL WITH, THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE  
POSIT  
IVE.

12. CANADIAN CHARGE MARSHALL INQUIRED ABOUT THE CONSULTATION  
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, SUGGESTING THAT THERE WERE SOME  
INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES  
FOR JUSTIFIED OR UNJUSTIFIED  
INTERFERENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE USSR'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA.  
AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD REPLIED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THE  
QUESTION HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BUT HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE  
  
COMMENT TO OFFER ON THE POINT.

13. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE  
SUBJECT WOULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER DURING THE COURSE OF  
THE PERMREPS' US TRIP AND UNDOUBTEDLY SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE NAC.  
RUMSFELD

UNQUOTE. RUSH

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptoning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 10 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 23 JUN 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** collinp0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973STATE123334  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** S/ S- O: JDLEE  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730635/abqcemqx.tel  
**Line Count:** 257  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** collinp0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 31 JAN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <31-Jan-2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <25 FEB 2002 by collinp0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** <DBA CORRECTED> srp 980226  
**Subject:** NAC MEETING JUNE 22: AGREEMENT ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR WAR  
**TAGS:** MARR, NATO  
**To:** WHITE HOUSE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005